Defeasible Reasoning in OSCAR by Pollock, John L.
1. General Information
The objective of the OSCAR project is the construction of a
general theory of rationality for autonomous agents and its im-
plementation in an AI system. OSCAR is an architecture for rational
agents based upon an evolving theory of rational cognition. The
general architecture is described in Pollock (1995), and both the
implemented system and related papers can be downloaded from
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~pollock.  The core of OSCAR is a
general-purpose defeasible reasoner. OSCAR consists of about 2
Mb of Common LISP code, and runs on any platform.
2. Applying the System
2.1 Methodology
OSCAR implements a form of defeasible argumentation theory
(as described, for example, in Prakken and Vreeswijk 2001). As
such, problems are encoded by encoding background knowledge,
inputs, and reason-schemas. There is no restriction on the form of
encoding, although first-order languages are generally most conve-
nient. OSCAR is equipped with a macro language for the easy
encoding of reason-schemas (see section 6).
2.2 Specifics
The system is not in any direct sense logic-based. On the
other hand, given a set of reason-schemas for first-order logic,
OSCAR also becomes a complete theorem prover for first-order
logic, and OSCAR is able to reason defeasibly about problems
expressed in first-order languages. The style of reasoning in OSCAR
is that of a “natural deduction” theorem prover, rather than a more
traditional resolution refutation theorem prover.
The motivation for building OSCAR in this way was to provide
a platform for defeasible reasoning, but OSCAR turns out to be
surprising efficient as a deductive reasoner. In a recent comparison
with the highly respected OTTER resolution-refutation theorem
prover (http://www.mcs.anl.gov/home/mccume/ar/otter) on a set
of 163 problems chosen by Geoff Sutcliffe from the TPTP theorem
proving library (Sutcliffe and Suttner 1998), OTTER failed to get
16 while OSCAR failed to get 3. On problems solved by both
theorem provers, OSCAR (written in LISP) was on the average
40 times faster than OTTER (written in C).
The principal contribution of OSCAR’s defeasible reasoner
is that it provides the inference-engine for autonomous rational
agents capable of sophisticated reasoning about perception, time,
causation, planning, etc. This is illustrated below.
2.3 Users and Usability
The potential user need not be an expert in logic or in LISP
in order to use the system, because reason-schemas are encoded
using the macro language. However, for sophisticated examples,
it may be useful to have at least some familiarity with LISP
because it is possible to insert bits of LISP code into the reason-
schemas. The user must, of course, understand how to reason
about the domain being encoded, because it is that reasoning he is
encoding. The system is completely general in its application, and
has been applied to reasoning about perception, time, causation,
the frame problem, classical planning, and is now being used to
develop a decision-theoretic planner. I am not sure who is using
the system. It is downloaded a lot from my website, and has been
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used in some advanced AI courses at other universities.
3. Evaluating the System
Benchmarks, in the traditional sense, are not appropriate for
evaluating a system of this sort. The evaluation of the system is in
terms of its ability to encode and solve hard problems in defeasible
reasoning. These problems could be called “benchmarks”, but no
two systems will encode them in the same way. This is illustrated
below by the Yale Shooting Problem, which OSCAR encodes and
solves very simply. By way of contrast, circumscription-based
approaches encode the problem in a completely different (and
much more complex) way.
Because there is no uniform encoding for the kinds of problems
this system tries to solve, it doesn’t make much sense to talk
about problem size. OSCAR is able to solve problems that are
generally considered difficult, such as Shoham’s extended predic-
tion problem (see Pollock 1998) and Stewart Russell’s flat tire
problem. The system is intended to solve problems of realistic
difficulty.
4. The OSCAR Architecture
The OSCAR defeasible reasoner provides the inference-engine
for the general OSCAR architecture, and is best understood from
that perspective. It is natural to distinguish between epistemic
cognition, which is cognition about what to believe, and practical
cognition, which is cognition about what to do. The latter is con-
cerned with goal selection, plan construction, plan selection, and
plan execution.
In OSCAR, epistemic reasoning is driven by both input from
perception and queries passed from practical cognition. This is
accomplished in the OSCAR architecture by bidirectional reason-
ing. The queries passed to epistemic cognition from practical cog-
nition are epistemic interests, and OSCAR reasons backwards
from them to other epistemic interests. In addition, OSCAR reasons
forwards from beliefs to beliefs, until beliefs are produced that
discharge the interests.
The principal virtue of OSCAR’s epistemic reasoning is that
it is capable of performing general-purpose defeasible reasoning.
All sophisticated epistemic cognizers must reason defeasibly. For
example:
• Perception is not always accurate. In order for a cognizer to
correct for inaccurate perception, it must draw conclusions
defeasibly and be prepared to withdraw them later in the face
of conflicting information.
• A sophisticated cognizer must be able to discover general
facts about its environment by making particular observations.
Obviously, such inductive reasoning must be defeasible be-
cause subsequent observations may show the generalization
to be false.
• Sophisticated cognizers must reason defeasibly about time,
projecting conclusions drawn at one time forwards to future
times (temporal projection).
• Certain aspects of planning must be done defeasibly in an
autonomous agent operating in a complex environment.
Defeasible reasoning is performed by using defeasible reason-
schemas to construct arguments. What makes a reason-schema
defeasible is that inferences in accordance with it can be defeated.
OSCAR recognizes two kinds of defeaters. Rebutting defeaters
attack the conclusion of the inference. Undercutting defeaters attack
the connection between the premise and the conclusion. An under-
cutting defeater for an inference from P to Q is a reason for
believing it false that P would not be true unless Q were true.
This is symbolized (P ˜  Q). More simply, (P ˜  Q) can be read
“P does not guarantee Q”. For example, something’s looking red
gives us a defeasible reason for thinking it is red. A reason for
thinking it isn’t red is a rebutting defeater. However, if we know
that it is illuminated by red lights, where that can make something
look red when it isn’t, that is also defeater but it is not a reason
for thinking the object isn’t red. Thus it constitutes an undercutting
defeater.
Reasoning defeasibly has two parts, (1) constructing arguments
for conclusions and (2) deciding what to believe given a set of
interacting arguments some of which support defeaters for others.
The latter is done by computing defeat statuses and degrees of
justification given the set of arguments constructed. OSCAR uses
the defeat-status computation described in Pollock (1995). (For
comparison with other approaches, see Prakken and Vreeswijk
2001.) This defeat status computation proceeds in terms of the
agent’s inference-graph, which is a data-structure recording the
set of arguments thus far constructed. We then define:
A partial-status-assignment for an inference-graph G is an
assignment of “defeated” and “undefeated” to a subset of the
arguments in G such that for each argument A in G:
1. if a defeating argument for an inference in A is assigned
“undefeated”, A is assigned “defeated”;
2. if all defeating arguments for inferences in A  are assigned
“defeated”, A is assigned “undefeated”.
A status-assignment for an inference-graph G is a maximal
partial-status-assignment, i.e., a partial-status-assignment not
properly contained in any other partial-status-assignment.
An argument A is undefeated relative to an inference-graph G
of which it is a member if and only if every status-assignment
for G assigns “undefeated” to A.
A belief is justified if and only if it is supported by an argument
that is undefeated relative to the inference-graph that represents
the agent’s current epistemological state.
Justified beliefs are those undefeated given the current stage
of argument construction. Warranted conclusions are those that
are undefeated relative to the set of all possible arguments that
can be constructed given the current inputs. Raymond Reiter (1980)
and David Israel (1980) both observed twenty years ago that when
reasoning defeasibly in a rich logical theory like first-order logic,
the set of warranted conclusions will not generally be recursively
enumerable. This has the consequence that it is impossible to
build an automated defeasible reasoner that produces all and only
warranted conclusions. In other words, a defeasible reasoner cannot
look much like a deductive reasoner. The most we can require is
that the reasoner systematically modify its belief set so that it
comes to approximate the set of warranted conclusions more and
more closely. More precisely, the rules for reasoning should be
such that:
(1) if a proposition P is warranted then the reasoner will
eventually reach a stage where P is justified and stays
justified;
(2) if a proposition P is unwarranted then the reasoner will
eventually reach a stage where P is unjustified and stays
unjustified.
This is possible if the set of warranted conclusions is D 2, and it is
shown in Pollock (1995) that this is true if the reason-schemas are
“well behaved”. The result is that if we allow the reasoner to
draw conclusions “provisionally” and take them back later when
necessary, the reasoner can be constructed so that “in the limit” it
produces all and only undefeated conclusions. OSCAR is based
upon an implementation of this idea. The result is that OSCAR is
the only currently implemented system of defeasible reasoning
capable of functioning in a rich logical environment that includes
full first-order logic.
A distinction can be made between two senses in which OS-
CAR’s reasoning is defeasible. It is diachronically defeasible in
the sense that the addition of new information can make a previously
warranted proposition unwarranted. This is the sense of defeasibility
traditionally studied in nonmonotonic logic. It is also synchronically
defeasible in the sense that further reasoning, without any new
inputs, can make a previously justified conclusion unjustified.
Notice that human reasoning is also defeasible in both of these
senses. In the face of synchronically defeasibility, a reasoner may
never be able to stop reasoning, and accordingly there may never
be a guarantee that a defeasibly justified conclusion is warranted.
However, an agent must act, and as it cannot wait for reasoning to
terminate, it must base its practical decisions on its currently justi-
fied beliefs.
5. Applying Defeasible Reasoning:
Perceptual and Temporal Reasoning
Given the ability to perform general-purpose defeasible rea-
soning, we can go on to provide an agent with reason-schemas for
reasoning about specific subject matters. For example, as discussed
in my (1998), among the reason-schemas standardly used by OS-
CAR are the following:
PERCEPTION
Having a percept at time t with content P is a defeasible
reason to believe P-at-t .
PERCEPTUAL-RELIABILITY
“R is true and having a percept with content P  is not a reliable
indicator of P’s being true when R is true” is an undercutting
defeater for PERCEPTION.
TEMPORAL-PROJECTION
“P-at-t” is a defeasible reason for “P-at-(t+D t)”, the strength
of the reason being a monotonic decreasing function of D t.
STATISTICAL-SYLLOGISM
“c is a B & prob(A/B) is high” is a defeasible reason for “c is
an A”.
6. Applying Defeasible Reasoning: Implementation
Reasoning proceeds in terms of reasons. A great deal of OS-
CAR’s efficiency derives from the fact that OSCAR reasons bidi-
rectionally. Backwards-reasons are used in reasoning backwards,
and forwards-reasons are used in reasoning forwards. Forwards-
reasons are data-structures with the following fields:
• reason-name.
• forwards-premises — a list of forwards-premises.
• backwards-premises — a list of backwards-premises.
• reason-conclusion — a formula.
• defeasible-rule — T if the reason is a defeasible reason,
NIL otherwise.
• reason-variables — variables used in pattern-matching to
find instances of the reason-premises.
• reason-strength — a real number between 0 and 1, or an
expression containing some of the reason-variables and
evaluating to a number.
Forwards-premises are data-structures encoding the following in-
formation:
• fp-formula — a formula.
• fp-kind — :inference, :percept, or :desire (the default is
:inference)
• fp-condition — an optional constraint that must be
satisfied by an inference-node for it to instantiate this
premise.
Similarly, backwards-premises are data-structures encoding the
following information:
• bp-formula
• bp-kind
• bp-condition
The use of the premise-kind is to check whether the formula from
which a forwards inference proceeds represents a desire, percept,
or conclusion (potential belief). The contents of percepts, desires,
and conclusions are all encoded as formulas, but the inferences
that can be made from them depend upon which kind of item they
are. For example, we reason quite differently from the desire that
x be red, the percept of x’s being red, and the conclusion that x is
red.
Backwards-reasons will be data-structures encoding the fol-
lowing information:
• reason-name.
• forwards-premises.
• backwards-premises.
• reason-conclusion — a formula.
• reason-variables — variables used in pattern-matching to
find instances of the reason-premises.
• strength — a real number between 0 and 1, or an
expression containing some of the reason-variables and
evaluating to a number.
• defeasible-rule — T if the reason is a defeasible reason,
NIL otherwise.
• reason-condition — a condition that must be satisfied by
an interest before the reason is deployed.
Simple forwards-reasons have no backwards-premises, and
simple backwards-reasons have no forwards-premises. Given
inference-nodes that instantiate the premises of a simple forwards-
reason, the reasoner infers the corresponding instance of the con-
clusion. Similarly, given an interest that instantiates the conclusion
of a simple backwards-reason, the reasoner adopts interest in the
corresponding instances of the backwards-premises. Given
inference-nodes that discharge those interests, an inference is made
to the conclusion from those inference-nodes.
In deductive reasoning, with the exception of a rule of reductio
ad absurdum, we are unlikely to encounter any but simple forwards-
and backwards-reasons. (This is discussed at greater length in
Chapter Two of my 1995.) However, the use of backwards-premises
in forwards-reasons and the use of forwards-premises in backwards-
reasons provides an invaluable form of control over the way rea-
soning progresses. This is illustrated in my (1998). Mixed forwards-
and backwards-reasons are those having both forwards- and
backwards-premises. Given inference-nodes that instantiate the
forwards-premises of a mixed forwards-reason, the reasoner does
not immediately infer the conclusion. Instead the reasoner adopts
interest in the corresponding instances of the backwards-premises,
and an inference is made only when those interests are discharged.
Similarly, given an interest instantiating the conclusion of a mixed
backwards-reason, interests are not immediately adopted in the
backwards-premises. Interests in the backwards-premises are
adopted only when inference-nodes are constructed that instantiate
the forwards-premises.
There can also be degenerate backwards-reasons that have
only forwards-premises. In a degenerate backwards-reason, given
an interest instantiating the conclusion, the reasoner then becomes
“sensitive to” inference-nodes instantiating the forwards-premises,
but does not adopt interest in them (and thereby actively search
for arguments to establish them). If appropriate inference-nodes
are produced by other reasoning, then an inference is made to the
conclusion. Degenerate backwards-reasons are thus much like sim-
ple forwards-reasons, except that the conclusion is only drawn if
there is an interest in it.
Reasons are most easily defined in OSCAR using the macros
DEF-FORWARDS-REASON and DEF-BACKWARDS-REASON:
(def-forwards-reason symbol
 :forwards-premises list of formulas optionally interspersed with
expressions of the form (:kind ...) or (:condition ...)
 :backwards-premises list of formulas optionally interspersed with
expressions of the form (:kind ...) or (:condition ...)
 :conclusion formula
 :strength number or a an expression containing some of the
reason-variables and evaluating to a number.
 :variables list of symbols
 :defeasible? T or NIL (NIL is the default)
(def-backwards-reason symbol
 :conclusion list of formulas
 :forwards-premises list of formulas optionally interspersed with
expressions of the form (:kind ...) or (:condition ...)
 :backwards-premises list of formulas optionally interspersed with
expressions of the form (:kind ...) or (:condition ...)
 :condition this is a predicate applied to the binding produced by
the target sequent
 :strength number or an expression containing some of the
reason-variables and evaluating to a number.
 :variables list of symbols
 :defeasible? T or NIL (NIL is the default)
Epistemic reasoning begins from contingent information input
into the system in the form of percepts. Percepts are encoded as
structures with the following fields:
• percept-content—a formula, without temporal reference
built in.
• percept-clarity—a number between 0 and 1, indicating
how strong a reason the percept provides for the
conclusion of a perceptual inference.
• percept-date—a number.
When a new percept is presented to OSCAR, an inference-node
of kind :percept is constructed, having a node-formula that is the
percept-content of the percept (this includes the percept-date).
This inference-node is then inserted into the inference-queue for
processing.
Using the tools described above, we can implement PERCEP-
TION as a simple forwards-reason:
(def-forwards-reason PERCEPTION
 :forwards-premises "(p at time)" (:kind :percept)
 :conclusion "(p at time)"
 :variables p time
 :defeasible? t
 :strength .98)
When giving an account of a species of defeasible reasoning,
it is as important to characterize the defeaters for the defeasible
reasons as it is to state the reasons themselves. The only obvious
undercutting defeater for PERCEPTION is a reliability defeater,
which is of a general sort applicable to all defeasible reasons.
Reliability defeaters result from observing that the inference from
P to Q is not, under the present circumstances, reliable. This is
formulated by the following reason-schema:
(def-backwards-undercutter PERCEPTUAL-RELIABILITY
 :defeatee PERCEPTION
 :forwards-premises
  "((the probability of p given ((I have a percept with content p) &
R)) <= s)"
  (:condition (and (s < 0.99) (temporally-projectible R)))
  "(R at time)"
 :variables p time R s
 :defeasible? t)
For an explanation of reason-strengths and projectibility, see my
(1998).
Similarly, TEMPORAL-PROJECTION is implemented as fol-
lows:
(def-backwards-reason TEMPORAL-PROJECTION
 :conclusion "(p at time)"
 :condition (and (temporally-projectible p) (numberp time))
 :forwards-premises
  "(p at time0)"
  (:condition (and (time0 < time*) ((time* - time0) <
log(.5)/log(*temporal-decay*))))
 :variables p time0 time
 :defeasible? T
 :strength (- (* 2 (expt *temporal-decay* (- time time0))) 1))
To illustrate the use of these reason-schemas, consider the
following problem. First, Fred looks red to me. Later, I am informed
by Merrill that I am then wearing blue-tinted glasses. Later still,
Fred looks blue to me. All along, I know that the probability is
not high of Fred being blue given that Fred looks blue to me but I
am wearing blue-tinted glasses. What should I conclude about the
color of Fred? Intuitively, Fred’s looking red gives me a reason
for thinking that Fred is red. Being informed by Merrill that I am
wearing blue-tinted glasses gives me a reason for thinking I am
wearing blue-tinted glasses. Fred’s later looking blue gives me a
reason for thinking the world has changed and Fred has become
blue. However, my knowledge about the blue-tinted glasses defeats
the inference to the conclusion that Fred is blue, reinstating the
conclusion that Fred is red. OSCAR’s reasoning is diagrammed
by figure 1, where the “fuzzy” arrows indicate defeat relations.
(For more on this see my 1998.)
(It appears to me that the color of Fred is red) at 1
Fred's appearing blue is not a reliable 
indicator of Fred's being blue when I am 
wearing blue-tinted glasses
(It appears to me that Merrill reports that I 
am wearing blue-tinted glasses) at 20
(Merrill reports that I am wearing 
blue-tinted glasses) at 20
I am wearing blue-tinted glasses at 20
Merrill is a reliable informant
((It appears to me that the color of Fred is blue) 
at 30)     (The color of Fred is blue)
(It appears to me that the 
color of Fred is blue) at 30
The color of 
Fred is red
The color of 
Fred is blue
˜
~The color of 
Fred is blue
~The color of 
Fred is red
Figure 1. Inference graph
7. Applying Defeasible Reasoning:
Causal Reasoning
For a rational agent to be able to construct plans for making
the environment more to its liking, it must be able to reason
causally. In particular, it must be able to reason its way through
the frame problem. OSCAR implements a solution to the frame
problem (see my 1995). It has three constituents:
TEMPORAL-PROJECTION, discussed above.
CAUSAL-IMPLICATION, which allows us to make inferences on
the basis of causal knowledge:
If t* > t, “A-at-t and P-at-t and (A when P  is causally-sufficient
for Q)” is a defeasible reason for “Q-at-t*”.
CAUSAL-UNDERCUTTER, which tells us that inferences based
on causal knowledge take precedence over inferences based on
temporal projection:
If t0 < t < t*, “A-at-t and P-at-t and (A when P is causally-
sufficient for ~Q)” is an undercutting defeater for the inference
from Q-at-t0 to Q-at-t by TEMPORAL-PROJECTION.
The latter are implemented as follows:
(def-backwards-undercutter CAUSAL-UNDERCUTTER
 :defeatee TEMPORAL-PROJECTION
 :forwards-premises
  "(A when Q is causally sufficient for ~P after an interval interval)"
  "(A at time1)"
   (:condition (and (time0 <= time1) ((time1 + interval) < time)))
 :backwards-premises
  "(Q at time1)"
 :variables A Q P time0 time time* time1 interval op
 :defeasible? T)
(def-backwards-reason CAUSAL-IMPLICATION
 :conclusion "(Q throughout (op time* time**))"
 :condition (and (<= time* time**) ((time** - time*) <
log(.5)/log(*temporal-decay*)))
 :forwards-premises
 "(A when P is causally sufficient for Q after an interval interval)"
  (:condition (every #'temporally-projectible (conjuncts Q)))
 "(A at time)"
 (:condition
  (or (and (eq op 'clopen) ((time + interval) <= time*) (time* <
time**) ((time** - (time + interval)) < log(.5)/log(*temporal-decay*)))
(and (eq op 'closed) ((time + interval) < time*) (time* <=
time**) ((time** - (time + interval)) < log(.5)/log(*temporal-decay*)))
(and (eq op 'open) ((time + interval) <= time*) (time* < time**)
((time** - (time + interval)) < log(.5)/log(*temporal-decay*)))))
 :backwards-premises
 "(P at time)"
 :variables A P Q interval time time* time** op
 :strength (- (* 2 (expt *temporal-decay* (- time** time))) 1)
 :defeasible? T)
These principles can be illustrated by applying them to the Yale
shooting problem (Hanks and McDermott 1987). I know that the
gun being fired while loaded will cause Jones to become dead. I
know that the gun is initially loaded, and Jones is initially alive.
Later, the gun is fired. Should I conclude that Jones becomes
dead? Yes, defeasibly. OSCAR solves this problem by reasoning
as in figure 2. By TEMPORAL-PROJECTION, OSCAR has a reason
to think that Jones will be alive. By CAUSAL-IMPLICATION, OS-
CAR has a reason to think that Jones will be dead. By CAUSAL-
UNDERCUTTER, the latter takes precedence, defeating the former
(for more details see my 1998). It is shown in my (1998) that
quite difficult cases of causal reasoning can be handled equally
simply by this system of defeasible reasoning. In particular, there
are none of the Baroque reformulations required by the
circumscription-based approaches.1 This, as far as I know, is the
first implemented fully general solution to the Frame Problem. It
is noteworthy how simple it is to implement such principles in
OSCAR, making OSCAR a potent tool for epistemological analysis.
The gun is 
loaded at 20
The trigger is pulled at 30
Jones is alive at 20
The gun is 
loaded at 30
~(Jones is alive)
Jones is alive
((The trigger is pulled when the gun is 
loaded) is causally sufficient for ~(Jones is 
alive) after an interval 10)
((Jones is alive at 20)      (Jones is alive))
˜
Figure 2. The Yale Shooting Problem
8. Applying Defeasible Reasoning: Planning
Given an agent capable of sophisticated epistemic cognition,
how can it make use of that in practical cognition? We can regard
practical cognition as having four components: goal selection,
plan-construction, plan-selection, plan-execution. Although it is
natural to think of these as components of practical cognition,
most of the work will be carried out by epistemic cognition. To
illustrate this, I will focus on plan-construction.
Standard planning algorithms assume that we come to the
planning problem with all the knowledge needed to solve it. This
assumption fails for autonomous rational agents. The more complex
the environment, the more the agent will have to be self-sufficient
for knowledge acquisition. The principal function of epistemic
cognition is to provide the information needed for practical cogni-
tion. As such, the course of epistemic cognition is driven by practical
interests. Rather than coming to the planning problem equipped
with all the knowledge required for its solution, the planning
problem itself directs epistemic cognition, focusing epistemic en-
deavors on the pursuit of information that will be helpful in solving
current planning problems. Paramount among the information an
agent may have to acquire in the course of planning is knowledge
about the consequences of actions under various circumstances.
Sometimes this knowledge can be acquired by reasoning from
what is already known. But often it will require empirical investi-
gation. Empirical investigation involves acting, and figuring out
1
  Examples of circumscription-based approaches are
Kartha and Lifschitz (1995), Shanahan (1995), (1996), and
(1997).
what actions to perform requires further planning. So planning
drives epistemic investigation, which may in turn drive further
planning. In autonomous rational agents operating in a complex
environment, planning and epistemic investigation must be inter-
leaved.
I assume that rational agents will engage in some form of
goal-regression planning. This involves reasoning backwards from
goals to subgoals whose achievement will enable an action to
achieve a goal. Such reasoning proceeds in terms of causal knowl-
edge of the form “performing action A under circumstances C is
causally sufficient for achieving goal G”. This is symbolized by
the planning-conditional (A /C) Þ  G.
A generally recognized problem for goal-regression planning
is that subgoals are typically conjunctions. We usually lack causal
knowledge pertaining directly to conjunctions, and must instead
use causal knowledge pertaining to the individual conjuncts. We
plan separately for the conjuncts of a conjunctive subgoal. When
we merge the plans for the conjuncts, we must ensure that the
separate plans do not destructively interfere with each other (we
must “resolve threats”). Conventional planners assume that the
planner already knows the consequences of actions under all cir-
cumstances, and so destructive interference can be detected by
just checking the consequences. However, an autonomous rational
agent may have to engage in arbitrarily much epistemic investiga-
tion to detect destructive interference. Even if threats could be
detected simply by first-order deductive reasoning, the set of threats
would not be recursive. The following theorem is proven in Pollock
(1998a):
If the set of threats is not recursive, then the set of planning
Æ problem,solutionæ  pairs is not recursively enumerable.
Corollary: A planner that insists upon ruling out threats before
merging plans for the conjuncts of a conjunctive goal may
never terminate.
If the set of threats is not recursive, a planner must operate defea-
sibly, assuming that there are no threats unless it has reason to
believe otherwise. That a plan will achieve a goal is a factual
matter, of the sort normally addressed by epistemic cognition. So
we can perform plan-search by adopting a set of defeasible reason-
schemas for reasoning about plans. The following are examples
of such reason-schemas (for details see my 1998a):
GOAL-REGRESSION
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving G-at-t, adopt
interest in finding a planning-conditional (A/C) Þ  G. Given
such a conditional, adopt interest in finding a plan for achieving
C-at-t*. If it is concluded that a plan subplan will achieve
C-at-t*, construct a plan by (1) adding a new step to the end
of subplan where the new step prescribes the action A-at-t*,
(2) adding a constraint (t* < t) to the ordering-constraints of
subplan, and (3) adjusting the causal-links appropriately. Infer
defeasibly that the new plan will achieve G-at-t.
SPLIT-CONJUNCTIVE-GOAL
Given an interest in finding a plan for achieving (G1-at-t1 &
G2-at-t2), adopt interest in finding plans plan1 for G1-at-t1 and
plan2 for G2-at-t2. Given such plans, infer defeasibly that the
result of merging them will achieve (G1-at-t1 & G2-at-t2).
A number of additional reason-schemas are also required, but a
complete planner can be constructed in this way. Given a recursive
list of consequences for each action, this planner will produce
much the same plans as conventional planners like UCPOP (Pen-
berthy and Weld 1992) or PRODIGY (Carbonell et al 1991). But
when the list of consequences is nonrecursive the conventional
planners will not return solutions, whereas OSCAR will still return
the same solutions defeasibly. The search for defeaters may never
terminate, but when the agent must act it can do so using its
currently justified conclusions, which include the plans that were
found defeasibly.
The OSCAR planner is a goal-regression planner, and may
seem otiose in light of recent advances in planning stemming
from Graphplan (Blum and Furst 1995, 1997) and Satplan (Kautz
and Selman 1996, 1998). However, I don’t think that is true. First,
those planners require complete knowledge of the world, even
down to knowing precisely what objects there are in the world
and what their properties are. This is not feasible for any realistically
complex environment. For example, the current upper limit of the
size of the world in which BLACKBOX (Satplan) can operate is
reported to be around 53 fluents (Weld 1999). That is impressive
from certain perspectives, but very depressing if one wants to do
real-world planning. Second, the jury is still out on the question
of why these planners work so well. Satplan’s strength may lie
more in its use of stochastic methods than in anything special
about planning (see Brafman, Hoos, and Boutilier 1998). Graph-
plan’s success seems to be based on an interesting feature that it
shares with OSCAR, and that may also explain OSCAR’s success
as a theorem prover. Graphplan controls the exponential plan search
by first building a structure (the planning graph) that it can compute
in polynomial time, and using that to guide the plan search. Inter-
estingly, on many problems more time is spent on building this
guide structure than in the exponentially difficult search for plans.
OSCAR works somewhat similarly. OSCAR performs bidirectional
search, but the backward search, which builds the interest-graph,
proceeds in polynomial time. This is for the same reason Graphplan
builds the planning graph in polynomial time. It builds a graph
whose nodes can have multiple origins, and it does not try to keep
track of a consistent chain of origins as it proceeds. Another way
to put this is that the backwards search does not produce “partial
proofs” (in the sense that UCPOP produces partial plans with
open conditions). The process of using the interest graph to construct
plans is still an exponentially difficult process, but like Graphplan,
it is common for OSCAR to spend as much time on the construction
of the interest graph as on the search for plans. More research is
required to see just why this general approach is so effective in
speeding up both planning and proof search, and to verify that the
same phenomenon is occurring in both cases, but this is at least a
plausible conjecture. It suggests that the OSCAR planner should
also be able to solve some of the hard problems that Graphplan
can solve but UCPOP cannot. Preliminary results suggest that this
is true. For example, the OSCAR planner solves Stewart Russell’s
infamous “flat tire problem” very easily (with an effective branching
factor of only 1.02). Graphplan was apparently the first planner to
do that successfully. UCPOP cannot solve it. I attribute OSCAR’s
success on this problem to the fact that OSCAR’s approach to
solving planning problems is much more like what people do—peo-
ple also find the flat tire problem easy, which is one of the reasons
it has been so puzzling that many planners have difficulty with it.
The question remains how successful OSCAR will be on a wide
range of planning problems. To get a better answer to this question,
OSCAR is being entered in the AIPS2000 planning competition.
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